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ABSTRACT 
Cutting-edge scientific research faces a global reproducibility crisis: scientists 
often cannot faithfully reproduce their colleagues’ experiments. Several domestic 
patent law doctrines would appear to mitigate this problem, including the enable­
ment doctrine in the United States, the promise doctrine in Canada and the 
Commonwealth of Nations, and Europe’s industrial application doctrine. But 
these doctrines’ disconnect from scientific practice and their broader international 
harmonization make them weak tools to combat irreproducibility. Given the 
increase of cross-border scientific collaboration and uncertainty surrounding cer­
tain types of new technologies, these doctrines seem to exacerbate the reproducibil­
ity crisis. Making these doctrines fulfill their promises to encourage reproducible, 
technical disclosures will likely require effort from a variety of domestic institu­
tions, including domestic patent offices, courts, legislatures, and universities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cutting-edge scientific research faces a global reproducibility crisis: 
recent advances in a variety of fields, from biopharmaceuticals, to 
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quantum computing, to aerospace engineering, cannot be faithfully 
reproduced by outside researchers.1 A recent survey of over 1,500  
researchers by Nature—arguably the world’s premier scientific journal— 
found that “[m]ore than 70% of [them] have tried and failed to repro­
duce another scientist’s experiments.”2 Scientific institutions around the 
world have accordingly reacted with alarm.3 
See, e.g., Francis S. Collins & Lawrence A. Tabak, NIH Plans to Enhance Reproducibility, 505 NATURE 
612, 612 (2014); Replicability and Reproducibility Debate, THE BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY, http://  
www.bps.org.uk/what-we-do/bps/governance/boards-and-committees/research-board/research­
board-resources/replicability-and-reproducibility-debate/replicability-and-reproducibility-debate 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2016) (hosting a conference at the Royal Society dedicated to measuring 
reproducibility in psychology); THE INTERACADEMY PARTNERSHIP, A  CALL FOR ACTION TO 
IMPROVE THE REPRODUCIBILITY OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH (Sept. 2016), http://tinyurl.com/IAP­
Reproducibility-Statement (last visited May 11, 2018) (convening an international group of 
science academies to improve the reproducibility crisis in biomedical research). 
Investigations into this crisis’s causes have examined almost every 
facet of both experimental design and the research enterprise.4 But the 
law’s contribution to irreproducibility—namely, patent law—has been 
overlooked. In several ways, patent law, both international and domes­
tic, encourages researchers to disclose their inventions as quickly as pos­
sible, even on tenuous data and even for bleeding-edge technologies 
with little guarantee of success.5 As a consequence, these patent incen­
tives encourage only minimal disclosure of nascent and complex 
research precisely where more disclosure, on more robust data, would 
be desired. 
Several patent doctrines throughout the world would initially appear 
to combat such naı̈ve disclosures. In the United States, the doctrine of 
enablement requires patentees to sufficiently describe their inventions 
such that “persons having ordinary skill in the art” can make and use 
them.6 In theory, patents that describe irreproducible experiments fail 
to describe to anyone how to make and use their underlying inven­
tions.7 In Canada and other parts of the Commonwealth of Nations, 
the promise doctrine “holds that if a patentee’s patent application 
1. See Regina Nuzzo, Fooling Ourselves, 526 NATURE 182, 183 (2015) (assessing newfound 
recognition of a reproducibility crisis). 
2. Monya Baker, 1,500 Scientists Lift the Lid on Reproducibility, 533 NATURE 452, 452 (2016). 
3. 
4. See, e.g., John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False, 2 PLOS MED. 696, 
697-98 (2005) (listing the variety of causes of reproducibility). 
5. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93-96 
(2009) (describing the negatives of early patent filing); Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s 
Reproducibility Paradox, 66  DUKE L.J. 845 (2017) (describing this process in pharmaceutical 
patents) [hereinafter Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox]. 
6. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
7. Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 5, at 847. 
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promises a specific utility, only if that promise is fulfilled, can the inven­
tion have the requisite utility.”8 And in continental Europe, the indus­
trial application requirement assesses whether patent disclosures allow 
the invention to be adequately “made or used in any kind of industry.”9 
Despite the potential for these three parallel doctrines, their spe­
cific application, alongside international agreements with broad har­
monization principles, fail to adequately police irreproducible patent 
disclosures.10 Much like international scientific standards, the weak­
ness of these patent law doctrines has hardened across jurisdictions.11 
Domestic institutions now have little power to invalidate or cancel 
patents grounded in specious science. Indeed, a recent decision by 
the Supreme Court of Canada—AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc.— 
has all but nullified Canada’s promise doctrine, in part to keep 
Canadian patent law harmonized with its treaty-mates.’12 
International patent law’s lack of an appropriate retraction 
mechanism—as there is in peer-reviewed scientific publishing— 
ultimately contributes to a cycle of irreproducible data: researchers are 
encouraged to file for patents earlier and earlier, on increasingly unvi­
able data, in an effort to thwart the commercial viability of their compet­
itors’ advances.13 Like experimenter bias or poor scientific controls, 
international patent law seems to play a role in fomenting irreproduci­
ble research. 
This Article in Part II first explains the problems of early patenting 
and patent disclosure doctrines in the United States, Canada and the 
Commonwealth, and Europe. Part III then shows how these require­
ments contribute to a cycle of irreproducible research. Part IV further 
explores how these difficulties particularly affect certain new technolo­
gies. Lastly, Part V briefly suggests ways to ensure international patent 
law’s disclosure doctrines can fulfill their own promises. 
8. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943, para. 28 (Can.). 
9. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 57, Nov. 29, 2000 [hereinafter European 
Patent Convention]. 
10. Id. 
11. See Terttu Luukkonen, Olle Persson, & Gunnar Sivertsen, Understanding Patterns of 
International Scientific Collaboration, 17 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 101, 101 (1992) (noting that the 
pedigree of international scientific collaboration dates back to the nineteenth century); Daniel J. 
Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation-States, 101 MINN. L.  REV. 167, 168­
70 (2016) (noting that IP treaties are designed to solve the free-riding problem). 
12. AstraZeneca, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943, para. 22. 
13. See Cotropia, supra note 5, at 93-96; Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 5, at 847-48. 
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II. EARLY PATENTING AND THE DOMESTIC DISCLOSURE DOCTRINES 
Ideally, patents are a societal tradeoff: inventors are granted time-
limited, exclusive rights to their inventions in return for full disclosures 
of them to the public, so long as they are both new and significant.14 
For simple technologies, enforcing this quid pro quo poses few prob­
lems: all domestic patent offices with examination regimes have some 
authority to reject patents on inventions that are not new, trivial, or 
fail their disclosure obligations.15 
See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, CERTAIN ASPECTS OF NATIONAL/ 
REGIONAL PATENT LAWS (Aug. 2018), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/scp/en/national_ 
laws/grace_period.pdf (comparing in table format the national disclosure requirements in 
member countries). 
But these requirements are not 
typically aligned with the scientific processes of experimental valida­
tion, peer review, or robust statistical checks.16 As a result, the intersec­
tion between domestic patent law and scientific norms is frequently 
troubled.17 
Several domestic disclosure doctrines from much of Europe, 
America, and the Commonwealth would appear to combat these diffi­
culties. At their core, they each require inventors to describe their 
inventions in sufficient detail to allow the public to practice the 
patented technology without substantial experimentation.18 To that 
end, many in the scientific community harbor the misconception 
that inventors must perfect their inventions before patenting or pro­
vide robust enough data to demonstrate that their inventions are 
14. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) (“[Patent 
disclosure] permits society at large to apply the information by freely making or using the 
patented invention after the expiration of the patent”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent 
Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 131 (2006) (“[T]he public benefits from the disclosure of the invention 
because the public storehouse of knowledge is thus enhanced, allowing others to rely upon the 
teachings of the patent to generate even further, follow-on innovation”); Sean B. Seymore, The 
Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 624 (2010) (“[T]he technical 
information disclosed in the patent document has potential immediate value to the public, which 
can use the information for any purpose that does not infringe upon the claims”). 
15. 
16. See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science, 94 NW. U.  L. REV. 77, 88-94 (1999) (describing some of these scientific norms). 
17. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97  
YALE L.J. 177, 216 (1987) (describing the disconnect of these norms between science and law). 
18. See Jessica C. Lai, Myriad Genetics and the BRCA Patents in Europe: The Implications of the U.S. 
Supreme Court Decision, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1041, 1048 (2015) (assessing Europe’s “industrial 
application” requirement); Jerome H. Reichman, Compliance of Canada’s Utility Doctrine with 
International Minimum Standards of Patent Protection, 108 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 313 (2014) 
(discussing Canada’s utility requirement); Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 5, at 865-68 
(discussing deficiencies in U.S. enablement law). 
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thoroughly viable.19 But disclosure doctrines from around the world 
typically require only that an inventor have “a definite and perma­
nent idea of the complete and operative invention.”20 Working proto­
types or robust, statistically powerful data are rarely required.21 
As a result, these domestic patent law disclosure doctrines often fail 
to police reproducibility in two respects. One, they encourage inventors 
to file for patent applications earlier and earlier—before working 
examples can be developed, before data and conclusions are subject to 
peer review, and before any broader implications of a new technology 
can be assessed. And two, the disclosure that is encouraged by these 
doctrines frequently operates at a level below scientific rigor—just 
enough to be considered legally sufficient but not enough to merit sci­
entific reproducibility. Brief discussions of these doctrines, and exam­
ples of their application, follow. 
A. United States: Enablement 
In the United States, patent law contains an enablement doctrine, a 
requirement that patents contain a written description sufficient to 
“enable” others to “make and use” the claimed invention without 
“undue experimentation.”22 Although an invention need not be com­
plete in every detail at the time of its patent application, “a patent is not 
a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation 
for its successful conclusion.”23 This statutory requirement arises from 
over a century of common law interpretation delineating the precise 
boundaries of sufficiency and the quantity of experimentation that, if 
needed to create the invention, would be impermissibly undue.24 
One of the interpretive difficulties with the United States’ enable­
ment requirement, however, is determining how to assess evidence 
of enablement—or lack thereof—arising after the filing of a patent 
19. Jacob S. Sherkow, Protecting Products Versus Platforms, 34  NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 462, 462 
(2016) (noting these misconceptions). 
20. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
21. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 349-51 (2010) (noting the 
absence of such a requirement in modern patent law—and the difficulties that arise from it). 
22. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
23. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966). 
24. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 275-76 (6th ed., 2013). 
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application.25 Because the statute governing enablement requires its 
assessment against the text of the specification, U.S. courts have typi­
cally been reluctant to import evidence into an enablement inquiry 
that was created after an application has been filed.26 
See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 923-24 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting evidence concerning the tenuous nature of the patent’s claims prior to robust clinical 
trials). Interestingly, Eli Lilly & Co.’s drug in this case, Strattera (atomoxetine), was one of the 
same underlying pharmaceutics giving rise to the company’s investor arbitration dispute against 
the Canadian government. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case 
No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 12, 2013), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ 
ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3544/DC4612_En.pdf (noting the upshot of this result). 
Nonetheless, at 
least some courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, the exclusive appellate court for issues concerning rejected pat­
ent applications and infringement disputes, have come to understand 
“after arising” evidence as sometimes demonstrating whether the pat­
ent could have been successfully “made or used” at the time the applica­
tion was filed.27 
This difficulty poses significant problems in the pharmaceutical field. 
As is the case internationally, U.S.-based drug developers frequently 
patent their inventions well before they have conducted any clinical tri­
als concerning their drugs’ use in human patients.28 The resulting pat­
ent claims covering such therapies nonetheless frequently contain 
preambles stating that the drug in question is, in fact, a “method of 
treatment” of a particular illness.29 In some cases, this assertion—after 
clinical trials and validation studies—turns out to be empirically false.30 
Wyeth Pharmaceutical’s patent covering hormone replacement ther­
apy for the treatment of a menopause-associated cardiopathy was later 
25. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 1098-1105 
(2009) (discussing the difficulties concerning unforeseeable “after-arising” technology). 
26. 
27. In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (allowing after-
arising evidence for the purpose of demonstrating the unfinished nature of the patent). 
28. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc) (per curiam) (Newman, J., concurring), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (“[T]he 
patent law places strong pressure on filing the patent application early in the development of the 
technology, often before the commercial embodiment is developed or all of the boundaries fully 
explored”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &  
TECH. L.  REV. 345, 348 (2007) (“Basic ‘composition of matter’ patents on drugs are typically 
issued in the early stages of product development, before the effects of these molecules have been 
tested in clinical trials”). 
29. See In re ’318 Patent, 583 F.3d at 1323. 
30. See Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 5, at 876-79 (discussing the following 
examples). 
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found to increase the risk of heart attacks in patients.31 Eli Lilly & Co.’s 
patent covering Xigris (drotrecogin alfa) for the treatment of sepsis 
was, after ten years on the market in the United States, found to simply 
not work.32 
Press Release, Eli Lilly & Co., Lilly Announces Withdrawal of Xigris Following Recent 
Clinical Trial Results (Oct. 25, 2011), https://investor.lilly.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid= 
617602. 
And Sanofi’s patent covering Plavix (clopidogrel) failed to 
account for a small but significant population of patients whose genet­
ics prevented the drug from taking its full effect.33 In all of these cases, 
after-arising evidence demonstrated that, even at the time of the drug’s 
patent application, treating physicians could not “make or use” the 
claimed invention as described.34 And yet, these companies’ potentially 
lucrative patents covering broad aspects of the underlying active ingre­
dients and methods of using them were never invalidated for lacking 
enablement.35 
Some of this problem is a function of how enablement is assessed dur­
ing examination in the United States. The U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) does not demand robust, reproducible clinical trials 
before securing drug patents. Rather, it requires only enough data to 
demonstrate a “reasonable expectation,” not scientific certainty, of 
an invention’s success.36 But enablement’s difficulties as a doctrine 
requiring the disclosure of reproducible data run deeper than that. 
U.S. courts’ confusion over the timing of evidence to be assessed in 
the doctrine,37 problems regarding the intersection between U.S. reg­
ulatory and patent law,38 and lax utility standards in the United 
31. Writing Group for the Women’s Health Initiative Investigators, Risks and Benefits of Estrogen 
Plus Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women: Principal Results From the Women’s Health Initiative 
Randomized Controlled Trial, 288 JAMA 321, 321 (2002). 
32. 
33. Michael V. Holmes, et al., CYP2C19 Genotype, Clopidogrel Metabolism, Platelet Function, and 
Cardiovascular Events: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 306 JAMA 2704, 2704 (2011). 
34. See Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 5, at 894-95 (drawing this conclusion). 
35. See id. at 876-85. 
36. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 2164.08 (9th ed. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
37. Collins, supra note 25, at 1098-1105; Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1, 16 (2005) (“On the question of whether the definition of an invention reaches beyond 
the state of the art at the time of the invention, the contradictions are most striking in the 
doctrines related to how far a patent holder can reach toward later inventions.”); Mark A. Lemley, 
The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L.  REV. 101, 106-07 (2005). 
38. Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and Biotechnology’s 
Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HAST. SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 137 (2011) (“Of course, 
standards of compliance with FDA regulations are not coextensive with the patent law’s 
enablement requirement”); W. Nicholson Price, II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied 
Competition, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1611, 1633-34 (2017) (noting the contest between patent 
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States39 all contribute to enablement’s relative weakness as a disclo­
sure doctrine. Despite its purpose, the evidence used to support the 
doctrine does not assess whether others can, in fact, “make or use” a 
claimed invention, but whether they merely have a “reasonable ex­
pectation” of doing so.40 
B. The Commonwealth: The Promise Doctrine 
In Canada, and several other countries within the Commonwealth of 
Nations, patent law contains a promise doctrine: a requirement to 
uphold promises of an invention’s use in a patent specification.41 
Unlike enablement in the United States—a doctrine focused more on 
the description of an invention than the claimed invention itself—the 
Commonwealth promise doctrine is a function of utility, an assessment 
of whether an invention is, in fact, useful.42 In the doctrine’s common 
law conception, for patents that contain “an explicit ‘promise,’ utility 
will be measured against that promise.”43 In addition, the “promise” of 
a patent arises from its construction: courts are to assess a patent’s 
promises “within the context of a patent as a whole, through the eyes of 
a [person having ordinary skill in the art], in relation to the science and 
information available at the time of filing.”44 
The differences between the promise doctrine and enablement stem 
from the Commonwealth’s comparatively stringent approach to util­
ity.45 In the United States, utility is, by far, the easiest substantive 
requirement for an inventor to overcome, and articles run riot with 
ludicrous examples of granted patents with only a comical sense of 
law’s disclosure requirements and those pertaining to a combination of regulatory approval and 
trade secrecy). 
39. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 24, at 255 (discussing the weakness of the utility requirement). 
40. Cf. MPEP, supra note 36, § 2164.08; see also Jacob S. Sherkow, Inventive Steps: The CRISPR 
Patent Dispute and Scientific Progress, 18 EMBO REP. 1047, 1049-50 (2017) (comparing the U.S. and 
European “reasonable expectation” standard in the context of the CRISPR patent dispute) 
[hereinafter Sherkow, Inventive Steps]. 
41. E. Richard Gold & Michael Shortt, The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around the World, 
30 CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. REV. 35, 37-38 (2014). 
42. AstraZeneca, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943, para. 28. (“The Promise Doctrine, as developed by the 
Federal Courts’ jurisprudence, holds that if a patentee’s patent application promises a specific 
utility, only if that promise is fulfilled, can the invention have the requisite utility—‘the promise of 
the patent is the yardstick against which utility is measured’”). 
43. Id. at para. 29. 
44. Id. at para. 30. 
45. Reichman, supra note 18. 
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usefulness.46 But utility has long been taken more seriously outside of 
the United States.47 With respect to these differences in utility between 
the two jurisdictions, E. Richard Gold and Michael Shortt claim that 
“[t]he law surrounding the ‘promise of the patent’ holds a patent claim 
invalid for lack of utility if the patented invention fails to achieve a 
promise made in the specification, even if the invention may otherwise 
possess a scintilla of usefulness.”48 And while the promise doctrine is 
typically recognized as being “uniquely Canadian,”49 a number of com­
mentators have demonstrated that the doctrine shares strong analogs 
to “inutility” in Australia and New Zealand50 and the “False Promise 
doctrine” in the courts of the United Kingdom.51 
Beginning in the mid-2000s, the promise doctrine shone as a beacon of 
hope against irreproducibility, especially in pharmaceutical patents. A 
number of federal court cases in Canada reaffirmed the vitality of the 
promise doctrine in Canada to invalidate patents that promised much 
but demonstrated little.52 In 2005, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Apotex Inc., 
the Federal Court of Canada, concluded that Bristol-Myers Squibb’s pat­
ent covering nefazodone for treating depression actually “promise[d] 
‘improved antidepressants with minimal side effect potential’” and put 
the issue to trial after discovery.53 Similarly, in 2009, two cases employed 
the promise doctrine to cast doubt on patents covering angiotensin­
converting enzyme (ACE) for cardiac disease. In Laboratoires Servier v. 
Apotex Inc., the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal affirmed the invalida­
tion of ADIR’s patent covering a group of ACE inhibiting compounds on 
the grounds that, despite the patent’s promise, not all of the compounds 
in fact inhibited ACE.54 And in Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., the 
Federal Court of Canada similarly ruled that Sanofi-Aventis’s Altace (rami­
pril) similarly failed to make good on its patent’s promise to both inhibit 
46. See, e.g., Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57 (2011) 
(“In the broad scheme of things, however, the requirement that an invention be useful has been 
nearly nonexistent—essentially ignored. . . . Patent applications that fail to meet this standard are 
rare, usually claiming perpetual-motion machines, chemicals with unknown effects, and other 
fantastic concepts”). 
47. See Reichman, supra note 18. 
48. Gold & Shortt, supra note 41, at 42. 
49. AstraZeneca, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943, para. 33 (citing cases). 
50. Gold & Shortt, supra note 41, at 53. 
51. AstraZeneca, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943, para. 33-35 (citing Norman Siebrasse, The False Doctrine of 
False Promise, 29 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 3 (2013)). 
52. Id. at para. 32 (citing cases). 
53. 2005 F.C. 1348, para. 16 (Can. Fed. Ct.). 
54. 2009 F.C.A. 222, para. 100-13 (Can. C.A.). 
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ACE and mitigate hypertension.55 Finally, in 2012, in AstraZeneca 
Canada Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals ULC, the Canadian Federal Court 
of Appeal concluded that while “an invention that does not do what the 
specification promises lacks utility,” AstraZeneca’s cancer drug patent 
made no such promises.56 
Recently, however, the Supreme Court of Canada has done away with 
much of the promise doctrine. In AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 
AstraZeneca’s patent covering Nexium (esomeprazole) touted improved 
metabolic properties (over a chiral variant of the same drug) such that 
the stomach-acid reducing drug would work for a wider variety of people 
than previous formulations.57 At trial, however, the judge concluded that 
this promise was not met at the time the patent was filed because these 
improved properties of the drug were “neither demonstrated nor soundly 
predicted at the filing date.”58 The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal 
agreed, and, in doing  so, “affirmed both the status and application of the 
Promise Doctrine.”59 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. It allowed 
the appeal primarily on the grounds that the promise doctrine—as a 
whole—was an “unsound . . . interpretation of the utility requirement that 
is incongruent with both the words and the scheme of the Patent Act.”60 
The promise doctrine, in the eyes of the Court, sewed confusion as to 
what constituted promises rather than mere hopes of utility described in a 
patent’s specification—something the Court previously sought to clarify 
in its 1981 decision, Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Saskatchewan) 
Ltd.61 Further, and in a mortal blow to the doctrine’s protection against 
irreproducibility, the AstraZeneca Court faulted the promise doctrine for 
requiring patentees to vouch for all promises made in a patent.62 To the 
55. 2009 F.C. 676, para. 119-28 (Can. Fed. Ct.). 
56. 2012 F.C.A. 109, para. 7 (Can. C.A.). 
57. AstraZeneca, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943, para. 9. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. para. 12 
60. Id. para. 36. 
61. Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Sask.) Ltd., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 504 (Can.). 
Consolboard concerned a patent covering wafer-formed wood particle board that the Federal 
Court concluded was invalid because it promised but did not explicitly teach making the boards 
by cross-cutting. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal because a person having 
ordinary skill in the woodworking art would have known how to cross-cut the boards despite the 
lack of an explicit teaching. The Federal Court opinion, the Consolboard Court concluded, 
“confused the requirement of s. 2 of the Patent Act defining an invention as new and ‘useful,’ 
with the requirement of s. 36(1) of the Patent Act that the specification disclose the ‘use’ to which 
the inventor conceived the invention could be put. The first is a condition precedent to an 
invention, and the second is a disclosure requirement, independent of the first.” Id. at 527. 
62. AstraZeneca, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943, para. 47. 
966 [Vol. 49 
PATENTS, PROMISES, AND REPRODUCIBILITY
 
contrary, the Court concluded that utility was unitary: that because “every 
invention pertains to a single subject-matter . . .  any single use of that 
subject-matter that is demonstrated or soundly predicted by the filing 
date is sufficient to make an invention useful.”63 
Despite its subjectivity, this reading of the promise doctrine is prob­
lematic. At its best, the promise doctrine nominally encourages disclo­
sure by demanding patentees to prove that their inventions actually 
work as promised. Allowing patentees, by contrast, to describe their 
invention as working in a broad series of applications—but mandating 
that they only demonstrate “any single use”—is not so much holding 
patentees to their societal bargains as it is countenancing the spaghetti 
method.64 
But even at its best, the promise doctrine was never perfect. Tethering 
disclosure to patents’ promises leaves room for gamesmanship.65 Clever 
applicants, of course, can make exceedingly smaller promises, and dis­
close concomitantly less in their applications, to circumvent the promise 
doctrine’s force. Further, for complex, data-driven inventions, the pre­
cise contours of the invention’s promise may not be known until much 
later—until far after the one-year bar against public knowledge or publi­
cation.66 Consider Eli Lilly’s patent covering Strattera (atomoxetine), 
for example. There, after several appeals in Canada’s federal courts, Eli 
Lilly filed a Notice of Arbitration against the Canadian government 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement, challenging the 
country’s courts’ employment of the promise doctrine to strike down 
two of Eli Lilly’s drug patents.67 In the underlying judicial disputes, 
Canadian courts had determined that Eli Lilly’s patents had either im­
plicitly promised a long-term, clinical benefit to taking the protected 
drug,68 or that the drug promised an effect in a “markedly superior fash­
ion with a better side-effects profile” than its competitors.69 In either 
case, the Canadian courts determined that the underlying data giving 
rise to those promises did not fulfill them at the time the patents were 
63. Id. para. 49. 
64. Cf. NEIL SIMON, THE ODD COUPLE 75-76 (1966) (throwing an entire plate of spaghetti—or 
was it linguine?—against a kitchen wall). 
65. Cf. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L.  REV. 
685, 687 (2009) (defining “gamesmanship” as “private behavior that harnesses procompetitive or 
neutral regulations and uses them for exclusionary purposes”). 
66. See Eli Lilly & Co., supra note 26, ¶ 39 (noting the upshot of this result). 
67. See id. 
68. Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2010 F.C. 915, para. 112 (Can.). 
69. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 2011 F.C. 1288, para. 209-10 (Can.). 
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filed.70 But a true assessment of either of these promises—a long term 
clinical benefit or comparatively diminished side-effects—would have 
taken much more than a year from when Eli Lilly first began trials in 
humans.71 As a consequence, Eli Lilly could not have proven its patents’ 
promises within the one-year grace period to as required by the 
Canadian court.72 Taking the promise doctrine seriously, here, merely 
counsels making fewer—and poorer—promises. 
Lastly, the promise doctrine does not aim at the heart of the problem 
described here: the disclosure of irreproducible results. Patentees, even 
within the one-year publication grace period, could experiment with 
their inventions for the sole purpose of providing the type of informa­
tion seemingly required by the promise doctrine but not with the rigor 
that scientists would put faith in.73 The promise patent doctrine, dead 
or alive, does not necessarily encourage the sort of disclosures needed 
to align the Commonwealth’s patent law with its scientific traditions. 
C. Europe: Industrial Application 
The European Patent Convention, in force in thirty-eight countries 
to date, similarly requires European patents to disclose inventions that 
are “susceptible of industrial application.”74 “Of course,” as noted by 
Jessica C. Lai, this is a tautology: “every invention has to have an indus­
trial application in order to be patentable.”75 Inventions not susceptible 
to industrial application are, by definition, not “inventions.” Further, 
the pertinent Implementing Regulations do little to illuminate the text, 
further defining “industrial application” as questioning only whether 
the invention “can be made or used in any kind of industry.”76 
Perhaps as a consequence of these interpretive difficulties, the EPC’s 
industrial application requirement has long been analogized to the utility 
requirement in common law jurisdictions,77 requiring merely that a 
patented invention have some, virtually any, use that does not broadly 
70. Gold & Shortt, supra note 41, at 42. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. See Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 5, at 889-92 (discussing an analogous 
difficulty in enablement in the U.S. with respect to Eli Lilly’s patent covering Xigris (drotrecogin 
alfa)). But see Novopharm, 2010 F.C. 915, para. 113 (commenting on the statistical controls of Eli 
Lilly’s clinical trials). 
74. European Patent Convention, supra note 9, art. 52(1). 
75. Lai, supra note 18, at 1048. 
76. European Patent Convention, supra note 9, art. 57. 
77. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 18, at 317 (making this comparison). 
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violate the ordre public.78 But the industrial application requirement is 
much more textured in practice, and demands patentees to explicitly 
disclose not only the objective of the invention but how to commer­
cially exploit it.79 Europe’s industrial application requirement thus, 
too, functions as a disclosure scheme. 
This is, perhaps, best illustrated by the Boards of Appeal of the 
European Patent Office’s decision in In re Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur 
Fo«rderung der Wissenschaften e.V.80 In that case, the patent applicant 
originally claimed, among other things, a method of identifying chemi­
cal compounds capable of mediating biological interactions concern­
ing a particular protein, BDP1.81 The application clearly described 
BDP1 as a composition, and the protein’s general significance in sev­
eral cellular functions, but failed to clearly explicate or provide proof of 
how those cellular functions provided a concrete, pharmaceutical 
effect, namely, the regulation of the growth of cancerous cells.82 
Indeed, the application was virtually silent in this regard, as it was clear 
that the applicant had hoped to patent the compound and its method 
of interaction first, and elucidate its clinical specifics later.83 This was 
too much for both the patent examiner and the Boards of Appeal. In 
its decision dismissing the applicant’s appeal, the Boards of Appeal 
tasked the applicant with laying “the whole burden . . . to the reader to 
guess or find a way to exploit it in industry by carrying out work in 
search for some practical application geared to financial gain, without 
any confidence that any practical application exists.”84 Even assuming, 
however, that the application had described BDP1’s anti-cancer proper­
ties, the Boards of Appeal further noted that the data on the subject, to 
date, was little more than “a vague and speculative indication of possi­
ble objectives that might or might not be achievable by carrying out fur­
ther research.”85 
Max-Planck might therefore be read as standing for the proposition 
that patent applications must provide at least some research data 
78. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 24, at 222 (discussing the ordre public limitation under 
TRIPS). 
79. See Lai, supra note 18, at 1043 (discussing the explicitness requirement); Huang Yan, Living 
Originalism and Patent Claim Interpretation: Reconciling Past, Present and Future, 25  FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 
273, 310 (2016) (discussing the “object of the invention” requirement). 
80. Case T 0870/04 (European Patent Office, Tech. Bd. App.). 
81. Id. para. 7. 
82. Id. para. 11. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. para. 19. 
85. Id. para. 21. 
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demonstrating an invention’s practical effect to satisfy the EPC’s 
“industrial application” requirement. But this seemingly sensible rule 
does not appear to condition the quality or nature of the underlying 
research—the pilot research putatively required by the European 
Patent Office may later found to be shoddy, imprecise, or irreproduci­
ble. In this sense, the EPC’s industrial application requirement, like the 
Commonwealth’s promise doctrine, predicates patentability on the 
quantity of data provided in an applicant’s patent, not its quality. In that 
vein, no drugs using BDP1 to date have been approved by either the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines Agency.86 
III. PATENT INCENTIVES AND IRREPRODUCIBLE RESEARCH 
Domestic patent law’s disclosure doctrines aside, patents operate as 
strong—perhaps too strong—incentives toward irreproducible research. 
In competitive, fast-moving fields, like nanotechnology, researchers often 
“race” to their patent offices to lay claim to early iterations of developing 
technologies.87 Consequently, researchers have strong incentives to 
design experiments based on the speed, rather than the quality, of their 
outputs.88 Researchers may also be encouraged to run their experiments 
using fewer controls or for shorter periods of time to obtain just enough 
data to satisfy their domestic patent offices.89 Studies imbued with such 
haste are prey to several drivers of irreproducible results, such as low 
sample sizes, a lack of statistical power, and variability in reference 
materials.90 
Broadly speaking, disclosure doctrines—like enablement, the prom­
ise doctrine, or industrial application—do little to discourage such 
behavior.91 To the contrary, irreproducible results may arise where a 
country’s patent system encourages researchers to disclose their inven­
tions, but only partially: enough to obtain patent protection but not 
86. Recent searches of approved drugs from both agencies did not reveal any approvals where 
the subject active pharmaceutical ingredient consisted of BDP1, nor known analogs of BDP1. 
Furthermore, neither BDP1 nor peptides derived from BDP1 are listed in the controlling 
pharmacopeias of either jurisdiction. Lastly, to date, only four drugs have been approved with the 
same mechanism of action as BDP1, i.e., as a tyrosine kinase inhibitor: imatinib, gefitinib, 
erlotinib, and sunitinib. None are BDP1 proteins or variants. See Nielka P. van Erp, Hans 
Gelderblom, & Henk-Jan Guchelaar, Clinical Pharmacokinetics of Tyrosine Kinase Inhibitors, 35  
CANCER TREATMENT REV. 692, 692 (2009). 
87. Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L.  REV. 601, 602-05 (2005). 
88. See Cotropia, supra note 5, at 93-96. 
89. Id. 
90. See Ioannidis, supra note 4, at 698 (listing these drivers of irreproducibility). 
91. See supra Part I. 
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enough assess or replicate the results. As previously discussed, this has 
been well documented in the biopharmaceutical industry where the 
intersection of patent law, clinical trials, and trade secrets has long 
counseled research companies to publicize preclinical or pilot studies 
while failing to make public their manufacturing methods or clinical 
trial data.92 The result is a woefully incomplete and non-replicable re­
cord of the efficacy of patent-protected drugs and medical devices. 
This is not altogether surprising. Patents can serve as a substantial 
prize for cutting-edge technologies. Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer’s 
early foundational patents covering recombinant DNA technology, for 
example, generated hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars in royalties,93 
well before industrial techniques like automated “cloning” of DNA 
molecules were invented.94 
Kary B. Mullis, The Polymerase Chain Reaction (Nobel Lecture) (Dec. 8, 1993), http://www. 
nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1993/mullis-lecture.html. 
Other similar, foundational biotechnology 
patents resulted in close to $1 billion USD in earnings in their technolo­
gies’ nascence.95 To that end, the promise of patents on foundational 
aspects of new technologies may simply be in direct tension with patent 
law’s disclosure requirements. Waiting to patent until the core aspects 
of a new technology have been fully ascertained may, simply put, be wait­
ing too long. After all, if one waits for the robins, spring will already be 
over.96
This tension between early and late disclosure in new areas is cur­
rently at issue for patents covering a foundational piece of biotechnol­
ogy known by the acronym CRISPR.97 
Antonio Regalado, Who Owns the Biggest Biotech Discovery of the Century?, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/532796/who-owns-the-biggest-biotech­
discovery-of-the-century/. CRISPR stands for “clustered regularly interspaced palindromic 
repeats,” given the structure of the DNA sequences where the technology was first identified. In 
bacteria, it functions as a primitive immune system. Id. 
CRISPR is a cheap, easy-to-use, 
and powerful gene-editing technology, heralded as the single most 
92. W. Nicholson Price II & Timo Minssen, Will Clinical Trial Data Disclosure Reduce Incentives to 
Develop New Uses of Drugs?, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 685, 685 (2015); W. Nicholson Price II, 
Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 
526 (2014). 
93. Jacob S. Sherkow & Henry T. Greely, The History of Patenting Genetic Material, 49 ANN. REV. 
GENETICS 161, 170 (2015). 
94. 
95. Alessandra Colaianni & Robert Cook-Deegan, Columbia University’s Axel Patents: Technology 
Transfer and Implications for the Bayh-Dole Act, 87 MILBANK Q. 683, 690 (2009). 
96. Cf. Warren E. Buffet, Buy American. I Am., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2008, at A33 (“So, if you wait 
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important breakthrough in biotechnology in decades.98 But it is 
embroiled in a patent dispute between two sets of inventors: on the one 
hand, Jennifer Doudna from the University of California, Berkeley and 
Emmanuelle Charpentier, then from the University of Vienna; and, on 
the other, Feng Zhang of the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard.99 
Although Doudna and Charpentier were the first to file a more basic 
patent application covering CRISPR, they did not avail themselves of 
expedited review at the USPTO.100 As a consequence, Zhang’s later­
filed patent application, one with a more detailed disclosure for how to 
work the technology in the cells of higher organisms, was issued first.101 
This triggered an administrative trial at the USPTO,102 and has compli­
cated the market for licenses to the CRISPR technology.103 While other 
researchers have made substantial progress in understanding the con­
tours of CRISPR, it remains unclear whether the disclosures made in 
Doudna and Charpentier’s initial patent application would, if used in 
recent advances of the technology, have been reproducible.104 
Sharon Begley, Lies, Damn Lies, and CRISPR: The Legal Battle Escalates, STAT NEWS, Aug. 
17, 2016, https://www.statnews.com/2016/08/17/crispr-patent-battle/ (describing the dispute 
as centering on whether U.C. Berkeley’s disclosures could have enabled a competent molecular 
biologist to use their technology in higher organisms). 
Perhaps worse, the incentives that come with patent protection can 
be construed as a form of experimenter bias.105 Researchers may 
be counseled to generate shoddy, and consequently irreproducible, 
results for their patent applications that they would not have otherwise 
attempted in more scientifically rigorous settings.106 This, too, seems 
like a logical consequence of the weaknesses in patent law’s disclosure 
98. Id. 
99. Jacob S. Sherkow, Law, History and Lessons in the CRISPR Patent Conflict, 33 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 256, 256 (2015). 
100. Broad Institute, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 106,048, 2017 WL 657415 (P.T.A. 
B. Feb. 15, 2017). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Surrogate Licensing, and Scientific Discovery, 
355 SCIENCE 698, 698-70 (2017); Jacob S. Sherkow, Pursuit of Profit Poisons Collaboration, 532 
NATURE 172, 173 (2016). 
104. 
105. See Seymore, supra note 14, at 639 (“[S]ome patentees deliberately suppress crucial 
information or purposely craft documents that are hard to understand”). 
106. See Cotropia, supra note 5, at 76 (“If patent law required a use of a certain commercial or 
social worth, an inventor would need to take time to establish that her invention provides this 
level of benefit before filing. She would need to find a commercially beneficial use for her 
invention. Then she would need to produce the data necessary to prove that her invention 
actually generated such a benefit. . . . This additional proof is just not required under the current 
utility standard for patentability”). 
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requirements and their importance to professional advancement. At 
their best, patents hold the promise of continued or outside funding, 
scientific prestige, and of course, personal lucre. These carrots are there­
fore a strong encouragement to report positive—and patentable—data, 
even faced with the sticks of potentially contradictory evidence. Like sci­
entific publications, patents are not granted for negative results.107 
This is not to say that all early-stage patenting is bad. Early patents 
may allow researchers to bring their inventions to commercial fruition, 
as documented by one recent and thorough study of first-time patent­
ing by startup companies.108 
Joan Farre-Mensa et al, What is a Patent Worth? Evidence from the U.S. Patent “Lottery” 
(USPTO Economic Working Paper No. 2015-5), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2704028. 
And earlier patents expire earlier, 
sooner allowing the claimed technology into the public domain.109 
But during their lives patents also allow inventors to stymie basic 
research by competitors—even if the data grounding the original pat­
ent later proves invalid or incomplete. As a consequence, patents 
grounded in truly embryonic technologies seem to encourage irre­
producible research—inventions that do not work the way that they 
claim or, worse yet, simply do not work at all. 
IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
This disconnect between scientific reproducibility and patenting 
poses special problems for complex or pathbreaking technologies. How 
much data needs to be disclosed to enable others to use inventions 
grounded in empirical analyses to prove their efficacy, like drugs and 
biologics? What are “reasonable expectations” for success of inventions 
in nascent fields, like quantum computing? And how can inventions pre­
dicated onmolecularly complex behavior, like certain high temperature 
superconductors, be described without the use of working examples? 
With respect to empirically based inventions, like biopharmaceuti­
cals, the USPTO’s own guidelines allow descriptions of single working 
examples, animal studies, or in vitro analyses that would not be enough 
to demonstrate that the inventions work in any scientifically rigorous 
sense.110 In the Xigris example described earlier,111 Eli Lilly & Co.’s 
107. Sean B. Seymore, The Null Patent, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041, 2048 (2012) (“[T]he legal 
system lacks a structuredmechanism for capturing and disseminating negative information  . . . .”).  
108. 
109. Cotropia, supra note 5, at 69 (“[T]he earlier a patent is filed, the earlier the patent 
expires, and the earlier the claimed invention becomes part of the public domain”); John F. 
Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.  REV. 439, 440 (2004). 
110. MPEP, supra note 36, § 2164.08. 
111. See Press Release, supra note 32, and accompanying text. 
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patent was not grounded in any pilot or clinical studies in humans, nor 
even individual medical case studies. Rather, it was based on a single 
preclinical animal study—in all of ten baboons.112 Even where later 
studies have affirmatively demonstrated the irreproducibility of preclin­
ical or even clinical data, patents covering those drugs are rarely, if 
ever, invalidated.113 
In truly nascent fields, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess the 
quality or quantity of data needed to ensure a “reasonable expectation” 
of success. This is, in fact, the heart of the dispute in the CRISPR case: 
whether Doudna and Charpentier’s landmark 2012 paper describing 
an engineerable form of the technology in vitro provided average molec­
ular biologists a “reasonable expectation of success” of translating it to 
human cells.114 The U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) found 
that numerous complexities in the cells of higher organisms, eukar­
yotes, gave scientists pause as to whether Doudna and Charpentier’s 
invention would work there.115 The PTAB recited a substantial body 
of evidence from the parties’ experts, including statements made by 
Doudna, and explaining doubts about using the technology in eukar­
yotes.116 At the same time, experiments conducted almost immediately 
after Doudna and Charpentier’s patent application was filed showed 
that these difficulties could be overcome with relatively conventional 
techniques.117 Predicting which experiments can be used to demon­
strate the applicability of routine techniques to new genetic engineering 
technologies remains a billion-dollar question.118 
Compare id. at *12-14 (describing the use of routine techniques in molecular biology as 
demonstrating the applicability of CRISPR), with Ben Fidler, Reality Check: Cancer Experts Discuss 
Hurdles Facing CAR-T Therapy, XCONOMY (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.xconomy.com/national/2015/ 
09/18/reality-check-cancer-experts-discuss-hurdles-facing-car-t-therapy/ (discussing difficulties facing 
developers of CAR-T, a genetic engineering technology, in using routine techniques of molecular 
biology), and Damian Garde & Meghana Keshavan, Juno Halts Its Immunotherapy Trial for Cancer After 
Three Patient Deaths, STAT  NEWS, July 7, 2016, https://www.statnews.com/2016/07/07/juno-cancer­
immunotherapy-deaths/ (discussing the surprising deaths of research subjects when subjected to a 
combination of an experimental therapy and routine chemotherapy agent). 
In other fields, such as quantum computing, experiments are notori­
ously unpredictable to scale.119 Whereas conventional computing relies 
on the flow of electrons through transistors to produce binary digits, or 
112. U.S. Patent No. 6,344,197 B2 (filed Oct. 22, 1999). 
113. Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 5, at 886. 
114. See Broad Institute, 2017 WL 657415, at *2. 
115. Id. at *16. 
116. Id. at *8-12. 
117. Id. at *12-14. 
118. 
119. John Preskill, Reliable Quantum Computers, 454 ROYAL SOC’Y 385, 385 (1998). 
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“bits,” (i.e., the representational 1s and 0s of modern computing), 
quantum computers rely on atoms’ quantum states to produce quan­
tum digits, or “qubits.”120 Physically isolating arrays of atoms to create a 
quantum computer remains a significant challenge.121 And, at least to 
date, a large-scale quantum computer processor has yet to be created. 
As a consequence, the methods and data required to demonstrate the 
success of such a processor are unclear. Nonetheless, the USPTO has 
issued several patents covering large-scale quantum processors, implic­
itly reasoning that, without more concrete guidance from the field, 
such processors have “reasonable expectations of success.”122 
Yet other technologies traffic in machinery so large and complex— 
think spacecraft, particle accelerators, or even high-throughput genomic 
sequencers—that they must be fully built and tested before they can be suf­
ficiently described, even if the basic science behind them is sound. 
Knowing, for example, Bernoulli’s principle—the law that governs the 
aerodynamic lift of a curved wing—does not mean one can draw function­
ing schematics for an airplane. But domestic patent law’s difficulties with 
disclosures in these areas mean that researchers can patent such complex 
inventions without ever demonstrating that they actually work. Famously, 
Blue Origin, a Washington-based aerospace company, received a 2014 
patent on landing a rocket at sea—a notoriously difficult achievement— 
even though Elon Musk’s company, SpaceX, was the first to successfully 
demonstrate the technology two years later, in 2016.123 
J. Foust, Patent Decision May Not Spell End of Blue Origin-SpaceX Dispute, SPACE NEWS (Sept. 10, 
2015), http://spacenews.com/patent-decision-may-not-spell-end-of-blue-origin-spacex-dispute/. 
Problems with patents on bleeding-edge technologies, such as these, 
demonstrate both the impotence—and the potential importance—of a 
variety of disclosure doctrines in patent law. It is absurd to allow any 
jurisdiction’s patent office to declare that a quantum computer has a 
“reasonable expectation of success,” despite the efforts of the world’s 
best scientists. At the same time, such standards are clearly what the 
law allows in the United States, Europe, and the Commonwealth.124 
Domestic disclosure doctrines, in whatever their form, should therefore 
explicitly require that patented disclosures be sufficiently reproduci­
ble.125 Whether the reproducibility of new technologies is ascertained 
before or after filing should be of little importance to the validity of the 
120. See id. 
121. Raj B. Patel et al., A Quantum Fredkin Gate, 2 SCI. ADVANCE e1501531 (2016). 
122. See MPEP, supra note 6, § 2164.08. 
123. 
124. See supra Part I. 
125. See Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 5, at 903 (making this recommendation 
with respect to enablement in the United States). 
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underlying patent. Making domestic disclosure doctrines more robust 
would consequently allow future researchers to use patents as scientifi­
cally rigorous disclosures. Whether such a standard is better character­
ized as enablement, promises, or industrial applications; or some 
combination of these; or other requirements is unclear and is, itself, 
probably worthy of some experimentation.126 What matters instead is 
allowing such doctrines to achieve their scientific, and not merely legal, 
purposes.127 
V. FULFILLING PATENTS’ PROMISE 
Aligning the power of the patent system with the virtues of scientific 
enterprise will likely require a coordinated effort among several stake­
holders: namely, domestic patent offices, courts, research institutions, 
and potentially, supranational treaty-making organizations. With respect 
to domestic patent offices, they have historically been poor arbiters of 
scientific validity.128 Some of this is due to the limited set of tools at their 
disposal, namely, a narrow focus on assessing technology in light of prior 
publications rather than current experimental data.129 Few patent offi­
ces rarely, if ever, ask inventors to provide confidence intervals, rerun an 
experiment, or provide an additional negative control.130 Ensuring re­
producible data in patent applications, therefore, likely begins at the 
ground up, from examiners themselves, where technically appropriate. 
At the same time, it must be recognized that patent offices often have lit­
tle power to demand any more data from applicants than their domestic 
laws allow.131 Rules or directives specifying the sufficiency of disclosures 
cannot be changed by line examiners’ whims, even in the service of their 
duties. 
What patent offices can require, however, is for their examiners 
corps to take domestic disclosure doctrines more seriously. In the 
126. Cf. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L.  REV. 65, 66-75 (2015) 
(arguing for local experimentation in structuring innovation regimes). 
127. See Sherkow, Inventive Steps, supra note 40, at 1045-46 (discussing the disconnect between 
these standards in law and science). 
128. See Jacob S. Sherkow, And How: Mayo v. Prometheus and the Method of Invention, 122 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 351, 356-57 (noting that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office does not have the 
administrative tools at its disposal to engage in scientific fact-finding). 
129. Id. 
130. See id. (discussing these deficiencies with the USPTO). 
131. See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) (discussing the limits of 
line examiner input in treaty implementation some of and advantages with respect to biodiversity 
agreements). 
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United States, for example, the USPTO could draft “Guidances,”— 
non-binding, but strongly persuasive memoranda—to its examiners 
clarifying what constitutes a “reasonable expectation of success” for 
groundbreaking or empirically driven technologies. In fact, this is the pro­
cedural vehicle the USPTO typically deploys to instruct its examiner corps 
after ground-breaking decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court or the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or major scientific break­
throughs.132 The EPO similarly issues Guidelines for Examination.133 
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE 
(Nov. 2016), http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/0791474853510FFFC 
125805A004C9571/$File/guidelines_for_examination_en.pdf. 
The 
Canadian Intellectual Property Office, meanwhile, infrequently puts out 
“Practice Notices,” both to practitioners and its examining corps.134 
See Patent Notices – Canadian Intellectual Property Office, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, 
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr00292.html. 
These 
Guidances can act very well as “policy levers”: 
legal principles that can be applied with sensitivity to the indus­
try and the factual context” of certain inventions.135 A guidance 
gives a domestic patent offices a hand in “‘making’ law because 
it adds new content to the previous, unclarified law. . .  . in  
response to new statutes, new judicial opinions, and new facts 
such as the emergence of new technology.136 
The rise of irreproducible research cited in patents is precisely the 
type of technological development that calls for such a policy lever, 
rather than a wholesale rewriting of statutory law. Nonetheless, courts 
should also take a harder look at how patents drive irreproducible 
research by reexamining their countries’ disclosure requirements. 
While imperfect, the Commonwealth’s now recently deceased promise 
doctrine was perhaps the best singular example of the judiciary taking a 
more active role in aligning the legal sufficiency of disclosures with sci­
entific reproducibility.137 At the same time, many U.S. courts have cab­
ined themselves to assessing enablement solely based on information 
132. Wen Xue, Note, Obviousness Guidance at the PTO, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 306, 
326-33 (2016) (describing the Guidance process). 
133. 
134. 
135. Mark A. Lemley & Dan L. Burk, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1670 
(2003). 
136. See Xue, supra note 132, at 329. 
137. See Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2010 F.C. 915, para. 113 (Can.) (commenting on 
the statistical controls of Eli Lilly’s clinical trials). 
2018] 977
 
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
 
published at the time a patent was filed.138 But this seems to exclude 
later attempts to validate the patent’s claims or future experiments that 
cast doubt on an invention’s mechanism or scope of use.139 That runs 
contrary to the purpose and importance of replication studies for 
newer, uncertain technologies.140 Courts should expand their focus 
and recognize that patents based on irreproducible data simply do not 
fulfill their societal quid pro quo of disclosing working inventions in 
return for a patent. 
Additionally, as an issue of academic integrity, research institutions 
must do a better job of demanding reproducible data from their investi­
gators’ patents.141 Like scientific publications, patent applications are 
published.142 Shoddy data in either venue can, and should, be an 
embarrassment to the institution sponsoring the underlying research. 
Furthermore, because in countries where academic institutions can 
take ownership of their researchers’ patents, universities typically hire 
and pay their researchers’ patent attorneys themselves, these institu­
tions have the power to require more and better data on patents bear­
ing themselves as assignees.143 Simply because domestic patent law may 
not require scientifically rigorous data does not mean that universities 
should follow. 
Lastly, national legislatures should begin the process of rethinking 
the hard bars on disclosure grace periods. In the academic setting, the 
race to disclose irreproducible research is complicated by these variety 
of doctrines concerning timing: how much time, for example, an inven­
tor has to file for a patent once the invention has made or disclosed else­
where, including peer-reviewed scientific publications.144 Generally, 
these “statutory bars” prohibit inventors from obtaining patents—even 
138. See Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 5, at 907-11. 
139. Collins, supra note 25, at 1104 (noting these limits). 
140. Ioannidis, supra note 4, at 698 (describing the importance of validation for newer 
technologies). 
141. Molly Silfen, How Will California’s Funding of Stem Cell Research Impact Innovation? 
Recommendations for an Intellectual Property Policy, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 459, 460 (2005). 
142. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2012) (setting for patents’ and patent applications’ publication 
requirements). 
143. See Brian J. Love, Do University Patents Pay Off? Evidence from a Survey of University Inventors in 
Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285, 304-05 (2014) (describing 
survey data calculating the rate at which universities pay patents’ prosecution fees). 
144. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and 102(b)(1)(A) (2016) (allowing a one-year grace period for 
inventions previously disclosed by the inventor in scientific applications); European Patent 
Convention, supra note 9, art. 55(1)(b) (allowing a six-month grace period for inventions 
previously disclosed at an “official . . . international exhibition”). See also Mark Schafer, Note, How 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Sought to Harmonize United States Patent Priority with the World, 
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on their own inventions—if the inventions have been disclosed to the 
public for longer than a year.145 The rule is even more stringent in 
Europe, which has practically no grace period.146 Again, many from the 
scientific community appear to believe that they are shielded from these 
limits if they have submitted a manuscript for peer review confidentially, 
or kept their invention closely guarded among colleagues.147 These 
should not be poor intuitions to hold and arguably speak volumes about 
the tradition and norms of disclosure in the scientific enterprise. To the 
extent these behaviors can be married with countries’ assessment of 
these grace periods, legislatures should take note. 
Suffice it to say that the causes of scientific irreproducibility run 
deep, well beyond patent law or any of the disclosure doctrines in any 
jurisdiction. But fixing them will indeed be but one, small advance in 
that regard. Doing so will go a long way toward aligning patents with 
their ideal embodiment of promoting scientific progress.148 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current crisis over scientific reproducibility is caused in part by 
global patent law. In a variety of jurisdictions, domestic patent law’s dis­
closure requirements do little to require scientific rigor in their patent 
applications. The enablement doctrine in the United States, for exam­
ple, often shields itself from evidence derived after a patent application 
has been filed, even if that information could inform a reviewing body 
as to what was known prior to filing. The Commonwealth’s promise 
doctrine, by contrast, previously encouraged inventors to describe their 
inventions’ objects in increasingly narrow terms, even as they strive for 
broader claims. And Europe’s “industrial application” limitation does 
little to assess the quality of research underlying the claimed invention. 
The lack of force of these disclosure doctrines is all the more problem­
atic for cutting-edge technologies, such as first-in-class pharmaceuticals, 
methods of quantum computing, and large-scale aerospace engineer­
ing projects. As a consequence, inventors are encouraged to obtain pat­
ents on their inventions on early, often less-than-reproducible, data. 
And this is exacerbated by the lucrative nature of foundational patents 
A Comparison with the European Patent Convention, 12  WASH. U.  GLOBAL STUD. L.  REV. 807, 824-26 
(2013) (comparing these two provisions). 
145. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and 102(b)(1) (2016). 
146. See Schafer, supra note 144, at 826 (describing the exception as “narrower”). 
147. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45  HOUS. L.  REV. 1059, 1084 (2008) (summarizing research 
describing these and other misconceptions among academic researchers). 
148. Cf. Rai, supra note 16, at 88-94 (discussing this ideal). 
2018] 979
 
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
 
on groundbreaking—and uncertain—technologies. Solving these diffi­
culties is a matter of aligning these domestic disclosure doctrines with sci­
entific norms, and by employing various governmental stakeholders— 
patent offices, courts, and research institutions—to recognize this inter­
section between patent incentives and irreproducibility. 
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